














Toward Environmental Responsibility of Thai Shrimp Farming 





March 2006  
All rights reserved. No part of this WORKING PAPER may be used or repro-
duced in any manner whatsoever without the written permission of IME except 
in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. 
 
© University of Southern Denmark, Esbjerg and the authors, 2006 
 
Editor: Eva Roth 
 
Department of Environmental and Business Economics 





Department of Environmental and Business Economics 
University of Southern Denmark 
Niels Bohrs Vej 9-10 
DK-6700 Esbjerg 
Tel.: +45  6550  4151 




Department of Environmental and Business Economics 
University of Southern Denmark 
Niels Bohrs Vej 9-10 
DK-6700 Esbjerg 
Tel.: +45  6550  4186 
Fax: +45  6550  1091 
E-mail: er@sam.sdu.dk Abstract 
The implementation of voluntary adoption of the Code of Conduct (CoC) to 
promote environmental responsibility and sustainable development of Thai 
shrimp industry is examined. Farmers’ perceived- benefits, risks and uncertain-
ties associated with the adoption and their perceived extra fixed cost are found 
to be the critical conditions to the success of the program. Improvement of 
farmers’ perception through increased information and knowledge, develop-
ment of supportive policies and mechanisms (i.e. a “Group CoC” system, insur-
ance program, a combination of environmental policy approaches) and 
strengthening farmer organizations and networks among and between the play-
ers throughout the market chain are suggested as to enhance the adoption and 
implementation of the scheme.  
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Aquaculture contributes around 30% of world seafood production (capture and 
culture combined). The global production of aquaculture shrimp alone was 1.6 
million tons in 2003 (FIGIS, 2005). Asian producers supply around 75% of the 
farmed shrimp. The rest is produced mainly in Latin America. Currently, Thai-
land is the second largest producer after China. Other main producers are Viet-
nam, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Brazil and Ecuador. While China consumes 
most of its production, Thailand exports nearly all of hers (90%) and remains as 
the leading exporter with 30% market share. Major markets are USA, Japan, 
and EU. Thailand earns more than 800 million USD annually from frozen 
shrimp alone. Earning of income from export has been the main driving force to 
the rapid expansion of the industry all over the world. Since the late 1990s, 
however, it has faced increasing pressures and difficulties. Some of the serious 
issues are bans on products found with traces of banned antibiotics and chemi-
cals, accusation of dumping (imposition of antidumping tariffs in the USA mar-
ket), disease outbreaks and spread (the later was caused by transboundary 
movement of live animals including the exotic species), and claims of environ-
mental and social impacts. These lead to a growing concern by governments 
and farmers that responsible shrimp farming and better management practices 
are needed in order to maintain the sustainable growth of industry.  
 
Article 9 of the Code of Conduct of Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) provides the 
general guidelines in support of responsible aquaculture (FAO, 1997).
1 The 
Code addresses externality issues and other aspects associated with sustainable 
development of shrimp industry. While it is internationally accepted, the Code 
is a voluntary non-binding instrument. However, it has been used as the basis 
for the formulation of regional and national code of conducts such as those de-
veloped by the Federation of European Aquaculture Producers (www.feap.org), 
Australian aquaculture (www.pir.sa.gov.au), SEAFDEC (www.seafdec.org), 
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1   Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). and Thailand shrimp farming (www.thaiqualityshrimp.com). The offshoot of 
the Code has included the code of practices for shrimp farming by the Global 
Aquaculture Alliance (www.gaalliance.org) and the Government of Malaysia 
(www.agrolink.moa.my/dof/). Furthermore, in 1999 the World Bank, NACA, 
WWF, FAO and UNEP (joined in 2003) formed a consortium program to de-
velop a set of International Principles for Responsible Shrimp Farming for 
worldwide adoption. The Principles address the following issues: site selection, 
pond design, water management, stocking, feeding, shrimp health management, 
food safety, and social equity. The set of Principles aims to provide specific 
guidance for implementing the CCRF and a basis for development of Better 
Management Practices (BMPs) as well as certification standards. The draft 
Principles (World Bank et al., 2005) is the product of global consensus among 
important players including farmer groups, industries, governments, NGOs and 
international organizations. It is being disseminated for public comment to be 
finalized in 2006.  
 
Thailand was an early mover in shrimp farming. Department of Fisheries 
(DOF) reported that in 2003 total shrimp farm area was 82,000 ha; total produc-
tion was 330,000 tons from 35,000 farms (DOF, 2005). The rapid growth of the 
industry in the past was achieved at the expense of coastal integrity. The widely 
acknowledged environmental impacts of mangrove conversion, abandonment of 
farms and effluent discharges, among others, should be accounted as part of the 
production cost (Pongthanapanich, 2005a).  
 
In Thailand, there are attempts to protect the environment through the use of 
mandate control. The main requirements concerning water pollution are pro-
vided for under the Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental 
Quality Act (1992). Under the Fisheries Act (1947), the notification imposes 
conditions (e.g. farm registration, effluent treatment) on shrimp farmers to con-
trol the quality of water and solid effluent. The prohibition of waste discharge 
into public receiving waters is also executed under the Navigation in Thai Wa-
ters Act (1913). This includes the recent effort to designate coastal aquaculture 
as a pollution point source, which requires waste treatment to meet aquaculture 
 
8effluent standard.
2 It only applies to an aquaculture farm with pond area of 1.6 
ha or larger. This would entail the monitoring of farm effluent of half the coun-
try’s shrimp production area (or 41,000 ha). Mangrove clearing throughout the 
country is now prohibited under the cabinet resolution. Farm registration has 
become a precondition of providing the movement document (MD). With MD, 
a farmer is allowed to transport each batch of harvested shrimp to the market. 
This procedure serves the traceability requirement.  
 
Using solely the command-and-control scheme such as the measures described 
above, is unlikely to effectively reduce environmental impacts and promote re-
sponsible shrimp farming. Thus, the government, since 2002, has also promoted 
the development and encouraged the adoption of voluntary management prac-
tices through the Code of Conduct (CoC) and Good Aquaculture Practice 
(GAP) schemes. Broadly, GAP focuses on assuring product safety, while CoC 
covers product safety as well as environmental and social responsibilities (the 
details are discussed later).  
 
Discussion in this paper centers on the environmental improvement role of Thai 
CoC in shrimp farming. It is observed that although the government has been 
using a lot of efforts to encourage its adoption, the number of adopters is still 
small (as shown later) to significantly reduce environmental damages.  
 
The success of the program clearly depends on farmers’ acceptance of the prac-
tices prescribed by the Code. The small number of adopters suggests some key 
questions, as follows: Why are Thai shrimp farmers seemingly reluctant to 
adopt the Code? What are their expectations? What factors can affect their deci-
sions? What mechanisms and policies can stimulate adoption and improve on 
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2   Notification of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment: Designated Coastal Aqua-
culture as Pollution Point Sources dated November 14, B.E.2548 (2005) published in the Royal 
Government Gazette, Vol. 122, Part 129 D; and Notification of the Ministry of Natural Re-
sources and Environment: Effluent Standard for Coastal Aquaculture, dated March 19, B.E. 
2547 (2004) published in the Royal Government Gazette, Vol. 121, Part 49 D, dated May 1, 
B.E.2547 (2004). The details are available at 
www.pcd.go.th/info_serv/en_reg_std_water04.html#s11.its effectiveness? These issues are explored in this paper. This paper, however, 
does not reexamine political debate and discourse associated with voluntary 
adoption (see Béné, 2005). The critical conditions to the success of voluntary 
management scheme are explored. This brings in some supportive policies and 
mechanism to be suggested for decision making for further development of the 
scheme to cope with the externalities.  
 
In the following discussion, the major environmental impacts from common 
farm practices are described followed by the response to these impacts by gov-
ernment through the program of voluntary management. The consequences of 
the program are investigated by reviewing farm-survey studies. Next, the criti-
cal conditions and barriers to adoption are evaluated. The experiences on volun-
tary adoption from other countries are also cited to provide other perspectives. 
Challenges of voluntary adoption as well as practical solutions to encourage 
adoption are then discussed. Suggestions on environmental policies and mecha-
nisms in support of the implementation are provided.  
2.  Common Practices and Environmental Problems 
Generally, shrimp farming systems are of three types, namely, extensive, semi-
intensive and intensive, according to intensity of input use and farm manage-
ment. Extensive farming is a traditional low-density practice. It is invariably lo-
cated nearest to the sea as it primarily relies on natural seed and feed. This sys-
tem is labor extensive and requires low capital investment, but usually requires 
a large piece of land. In contrast, intensive system requires less land but a high 
investment, characterized by a high stocking density and needs of good pond 
management techniques. It relies on artificial feed and usually chemicals, and 
needs pond aeration equipment. Pond soil condition needs to be maintained and 
water and effluent management is a requirement. 
 
In Thailand, intensive farming has rapidly increased in terms of number of 
farms, area, output (see Figure 1) and therefore environmental impacts. Around 
 
1090% of the farms apply this system, which covers 80% of the total culture area 
and contributes 98% to total production. Due to high stocking, feed is the main 
cost item ranging from 40 to 60% of total cost (see the survey results in Tok-
risna, 2004, for instance). Intensive farming requires 1.2 to 2 kilos of pellet 
feed, which contains high protein (20-40% by weight),
3 to grow a kilo of 
shrimp.
4 The main source of protein is fish meal (15-35%). Although feed qual-
ity is being improved, feed loss is unavoidable. Clay (2004) stated that the loss 
is as much as 33%. The uneaten feed and shrimp waste lead to the accumulation 
of nutrient load in water effluent and bottom pond sludge. 
 































Source: Data from DOF (2005).  
 
The common practices (characterized by the non-adoption of good management 
practices) in intensive farming are usually claimed as a source of water pollu-
tion as a result of discharges of untreated farm effluent to public receiving wa-
ters. This can cause self-pollution and disease outbreak, which has resulted in 
                                                            
3   Depending on shrimp species, i.e. 20-35% for Penaeus vannamei and 36-42% for Penaeus 
monodon or Penaeus stylirostris (Briggs et. al., 2004: 15). 
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4   Farmers simply use this basis to estimate shrimp food conversion ratio (FCR). the collapse of business and abandonment of farms. Disease outbreaks have 
been triggered by such factors as the deterioration of pond sediment quality, 
loss of essential minerals from pond soil, and poor pond management (Dierberg 
and Kiattisimkul, 1996). Farmers usually deal with disease outbreaks with 
higher dosage of drugs and chemicals and sometimes with non-prescribed 
drugs. This results in the increase of production cost and prompts importing 
countries to ban products found with traces of banned chemicals or drugs by 
importing countries.  
 
Hossain and Kwei Lin (2001:4) cited that 20,800 ha of shrimp farms in Thai-
land were left abandoned in 1996; unofficial estimates placed the figure as high 
as 70% after a period of shrimp production. Abandoned farms entail an envi-
ronmental cost of around 1,000 USD/ha in converted mangrove area (adapted 
from Sathirathai and Barbier, 2004) and 220 USD/ha in converted agricultural 
area (based on Kantangkul, 2002). See more details in Pongthanapanich 
(2005a). 
 
Poor farm siting was considered as the largest source of conflict with local 
communities and other resource users (Clay, 2004: 500). Poor siting can lead to 
poor quality of water supply and inability to properly manage the effluent. 
These affect on-farm production and farm management practices. Poor siting is 
an important issue for Thailand where 80% of the farms are small-scale (less 
than 1.6 ha). Small farms usually have low investment fund and less flexibility 
for site selection. Loss of mangrove due to shrimp farms is prevalent, particu-
larly during the boom period of the industry. Charuppat and Charuppat (1997) 
reported that around 17% (65,000 ha) of total mangrove area had been con-
verted to shrimp farms.  This common practice generates economic loss of 
around 3,260 UDS/ha in mangrove forgone benefits (adapted from Sathirathai, 
1998; Sathirathai and Barbier, 2004). Poor siting can have negative impacts on 
agricultural crops mainly due to dispersal and seepage of saline water to nearby 
crops as in the case of inland low-salinity shrimp farming in central Thailand 
(see discussion in Pongthanapanich, 1999, for instance).  
 
 
12These environmental problems are widely recognized in Thailand. There are 
growing concerns over the problems of traditional farming practices. As de-
scribed, some types of pollution directly affect the shrimp industry at on-farm 
level, some at the market level. Better management practices in shrimp farming 
are therefore expected to reduce environmental damages, stabilize farm in-
comes, improve market access and reduce social conflict of resource use, all of 
which promote the sustainability of the industry.  
3.  Management Responding to the Problems with 
Voluntary Scheme 
The voluntary adoption of CoC and GAP has been encouraging by the Thai 
government in response to the problems. In 1998, the DOF initiated the formu-
lation of Thai CoC with assistance from the World Bank. In 2000, the Depart-
ment launched the pilot COC project in the provinces of Rayong and Songkla. 
The formal guidelines, including certification process and inspection guidelines 
have been implemented since 2002. The policy statements address environ-
mental protection, regulatory compliance, quality and safety, efficiency, social 
responsibility, education and training, public consultation, location, continual 
improvement, research and development, monitoring and auditing, and interna-
tional trade.  
 
The guidelines for Thai CoC shrimp farming were developed in accordance 
with Article 9 of the CCRF, which supports responsible aquaculture, and 
ISO14001 or Environmental Management System (EMS). The CoC also pro-
vides harvest and transportation guidelines thus enabling traceability. The com-
ponents of the Code comprise operational guidelines and manuals for all opera-
tors in the market chain (from hatchery operators to exporters), certification 
process for the operators, and incentives such as price differentiation through 
certified products. The CoC seal of quality, “Thai Quality Shrimp” label, as-
sures standard production method, high quality and safe product and environ-
mentally friendly production (Marine Shrimp Culture Research Institute, 
 
13www.thaiqualityshrimp.com). The certification process for quality product la-
beling is presented in Appendix 1.  
 
The operational guidelines of CoC, on which the development of farm manuals 
and farm evaluation were based, are classified into 11 standards: 1) site selec-
tion such as outside mangrove zone and legal land with the farm being regis-
tered, 2) general pond management such as farm layout, pond preparation, wa-
ter and pond soil quality check, water management, and other daily farm opera-
tions, 3) stocking such as proper density, qualified seed size and quality seed, 4) 
feed management such as reduced feed and proper feeding, feed storage, effi-
cient food conversion ratio, 5) shrimp health management such as daily health 
check, disease control and prevention, 6) therapeutic agents and chemicals, in 
which only specified therapeutants are used and only when absolutely neces-
sary, 7) effluent management such as water effluent and sludge treatment in-
cluding farm sanitation methods, 8) harvesting and distribution such as harvest-
ing plan and methods, quality and anti-biotic residue checking, 9) social re-
sponsibility concern over labor welfare and participation with local community, 
10) farmers association and training, and 11) farm record keeping to facilitate 
evaluation. Farm evaluation guideline assigns different weights, ranging from 
5-15%, to each standard. Details are available at www.fisheries.go.th/coastal/ 
and DOF (2003). The guidelines for GAP are less stringent than CoC. These 
cover 7 standards: site selection, pond management, feed management, shrimp 
health management, cleanliness of equipment, and necessary farm record. DOF 
expects that the GAP will prepare farmers for adoption of CoC.  
 
Under CoC quality shrimp project (2002-2006), DOF received almost 1 million 
USD of budget for the first year and an additional 3.75 million USD was 
planned (www.thaiqualityshrimp.com/coc/). The project provides technical ad-
vice including trainers to help farmers develop farm manuals under CoC. Other 
forms of assistance are free services such as shrimp disease, water and soil 
quality check. Farm registration is required as a precondition of participation. 
The certification process includes farm evaluation, scoring and inspection. The 
certificate is valid for 6 months, 1 or 2 years depending on the degree of adop-
 
14tion performance evaluated. The procedure of certifying the CoC farm is pre-
sented in Appendix 2. The expectation was for all 1,000 hatcheries, 50% of 
farms (15,000 farms at that time), 120 harvested shrimp distributors, all feed 
and chemical enterprises (300 traders) and 10 processing factories (0.05%) to 
participate in the program.  
4.  CoC Farm Performance and Farmers’ Expectations 
In 2002, the Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE) conducted a survey of 
CoC and non-CoC farms in the provinces of Rayong and Songkla (OAE, 2004). 
The survey showed that the practices under CoC, which contribute directly to 
reduce environmental impacts were: 1) farm sites — located in promoted 
coastal land and non-mangrove area, and 2) management of farm effluent— 
provision of sufficient water treatment pond and sludge dumpsite, use of or-
ganic treatment, and closed or semi-closed or recycled water system to reduce 
water exchange and discharge. It was found that CoC farms allocated farm land 
for water treatment in a higher proportion than non-CoC farms. CoC farms thus 
had a lower proportion of culture area (see Table 1). Other management prac-
tices such as stocking, feeding, chemical use were also improved.  
 
Based on the same survey, farmers’ expectations from CoC adoption were 
lower production cost (due to reduced seed, feed and chemical use), higher sur-
vival rate, less frequency of disease occurrence, and larger shrimp. On the other 
hand, inadequate farm land and lack of information on the program were given 
as the main reasons for non adoption. However, it turned out that shrimp yields 
were not that different between CoC and non-CoC farms. Although survival 
rate in CoC farms was lower, the size of harvested shrimp was significantly lar-
ger than those from non-CoC farms (See Table 1). 
 
 
15Table 1.  CoC and non-CoC farms performance in Rayong province, 2002  
Items CoC  Non-CoC 
1. Farm structure (area in hectare)  7.7 (100%)  3.6 (100%) 
    - Culture area  3.3 (43%)  2.0 (55%) 
    - Water treatment pond/ reservoir  1.6 (22%)  0.4 (11%) 
    - Sludge dumpsite  0.4 (6%)  0.2 (6%) 
    - Others (dike, road, etc.)   2.3 (29%)  1.0 (28%) 
2. Number of crop per year   2  2 
3. Culture period (days/crop)  120  120 
4. Stocking (PLs/ha-culture area)  388,000  400,000 
5. Survival rate   59%  69% 
6. Yield (kg/ha-culture area )  4175  4137 
7. Size of harvested shrimp (pieces/kg)  55  67 
Note:  The analysis was based on the survey of 10 CoC farms and 10 non-CoC farms of Penaeus 
monodon (Black Tiger Shrimp) culture. 
Source: Adapted from OAE (2004). 
 
Additionally, based on farm area, the CoC farms incurred lower cost but had 
lower yield and lower profit per hectare than those non-CoC farms. This is not 
surprising since the CoC farms had relatively larger total farm areas, but a 
smaller proportion of culture areas. However, the average production cost per 
kilogram of the CoC farms was 0.15 USD higher. Obviously, larger fixed cost 
was the main item that contributed to this outcome. Furthermore, due to the lar-
ger shrimp size obtained, the CoC farms received a higher price by 0.63 
USD/kg on average than the non-CoC. This resulted in a higher net profit of 
0.48 USD/kg. See Table 2. It should be noted that the higher price was simply 
from having a bigger size shrimp, not from a premium farm-gate price for a 
CoC product. 
 
16Table 2.  Cost and return of CoC and non-CoC farms in Rayong province, 
2002 (Black Tiger Shrimp) 
CoC [1]  Non-CoC [2]  [1]-[2]  Items 
Total % Total  %  (USD/kg) 
1. Variable costs (USD/ha)*  4947  86.7  6362  92.2  -0.04 
Seed 496  8.7  582  8.4   0.02 
Pond preparation  84  1.5  134  1.9  -0.01 
Feed 2122  37.2  3118  45.2  -0.19 
Labor 605  10.6  666  9.6   0.04 
Chemicals 79  1.4  185  2.7  -0.04 
Gasoline 511  9.0  435  6.3   0.09 
Electricity   274  4.8  766  11.1  -0.18 
Equipment and repair  137  2.4  95  1.4   0.03 
Interest 210  3.7  257  3.7   0.00 
Others 429  7.5  126  1.8   0.18 
2. Fixed costs (USD/ha)*  762  13.3  538  7.8   0.19 
Tax and land rent  236  4.1  339  4.9  -0.02 
Depreciation & opportunity cost  526  9.2  200  2.9   0.20 
3. Total cost (USD/ha)*  5709  100.0  6900  100.0    
4. Production (kg/ha)*  1800    2281     
5. Size (pieces/kg)  55    69     
6. Price (USD/kg)  5.63    5.00     0.63 
7. Return (USD/ha)*  10134    11405     
8. Net profit (USD/ha)*  4416    4506     
9. Cost (USD/kg)  3.17    3.02     0.15 
10. Net profit (USD/kg)  2.45    1.98     0.48 
Note:  1) The analysis was based on the survey of 10 CoC farms and 10 non-CoC farms of 
Penaeus monodon (Black Tiger Shrimp) culture.  
  2) * On the basis of farm area. 
  3) 1 USD = 40 THB. 
Source: Adapted from OAE (2004). 
 
Farmers’ expectation of the CoC program significantly relates to some variables 
that reflect technical and economic efficiency. This was revealed by a survey of 
30 CoC farms (40% of respondents with 1-4 ha of farm area, and 60% with 4-
32 ha) in Rayong province (Ampornpong, 2002). Small farmers whose owner-
ship of the land is less secure, had lower investment and less experiences tended 
to have a higher expectation of the CoC program than larger farmers. The latter 
 
17can adapt better to the changes in market requirements and environmental im-
provement norm. They are better able to adjust their practices in accordance 
with CoC requirements. In contrast, small farmers individually are more vul-
nerable to risks that the changes may bring, as discussed next.  
5.  Critical Conditions and Barriers to CoC Adoption 
There are around 35,000 total shrimp farms and more than 1,000 hatcheries 
throughout Thailand. Only 146 farms and 140 hatcheries are certified CoC pro-
ducers (www.thaiqualityshrimp.com, accessed 12 February, 2006). On the other 
hand, the adopters of GAP, which focuses on product safety, include 28,719 
farms and 1,679 hatcheries. It appears that farmers are more responsive to the 
product safety requirements of the market, which is what GAP targets, than 
CoC’s environmental standards. This indicates that farmers are likely to adopt a 
practice if the benefit is well perceived, in this case consumer recognition or ac-
ceptance of the GAP product. On the other hand, market-related benefits from 
environmental improvements, such as from the adoption of CoC’s more strin-
gent standards, are less easy to perceive. In this regard, it is logical to expect, 
and the number of adopters show, that farmers would be more difficult to con-
vince to adopt CoC than GAP. 
 
Evidences from voluntary adoption of BMPs that reduce non-point source pol-
lution in the agriculture sector indicate that BMPs reduce input use. This saving 
covers the cost of adoption, yet farmers do not readily adopt the practices 
(Mitchell and Hennessy, 2003). In addition to cost, other factors such as profit 
uncertainty and farmers’ risk aversion behavior
5 influence adoption decision. In 
support of the above findings, Pannell (2003) stated that uncertainty about eco-
nomic performance and biological productivity of sustainable farming practices 
inhibits adoption. Due to risk aversion, farmers place greater weight on poten-
tial negative outcomes than on positive outcomes of adoption. In some cases of 
uncertainty, farmers are better off by waiting to adopt. Therefore, their final de-
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5   Farmers are prepared to forgo some income as to avoid risk and uncertainty outcome. cision is based not only on perceived benefits (i.e. perceived return enhancing 
or perceived cost reduction) but also perceived risks and uncertainties associ-
ated with adoption and industry per se. These factors would explain the slow 
adoption of environmentally friendly practices in shrimp farming as the details 
described below.  
 
Risk from diseases considerably adds to the uncertainty of making a profit; it 
would also affect the effectiveness of CoC. Culture of indigenous species, 
Penaeus monodon (Black Tiger Shrimp) has been frequently hit by diseases, in 
particular Yellow Head Virus and White Spot Syndrome Virus. In 1998, a new 
species, Penaeus vannamei (Pacific Whiteleg Shrimp), was introduced to Thai-
land. The production of this species started growing considerably in 2003. It 
normally commands a lower price compared size-by-size with P. monodon. But 
it has some advantages over P. monodon such as rapid growth rate, tolerance of 
high stocking density, lower protein requirement and therefore feed cost, certain 
disease resistance (if specific pathogen resistance, SPR, stocks are used), and 
high survival during larval rearing (Briggs et al., 2004). This can result in a 
higher profit, if not per kilogram, per volume of production (see Appendix 3). 
Additionally, specific pathogen free, SPF, stocks are commercially available 
from the USA, while the breeding of P. monodon still relies on wild broodstock 
and SPF/SPR stocks are not yet available. However, the use of cheaper non-
SPF stocks of P. vannamei have brought in new diseases to Thailand such as 
Taura Syndrome Virus as well as a LOVV
6-like virus suspected to cause the 
slow-growth syndrome in P. monodon. Other long-term negative consequences 
have not yet been studied (Briggs et al. 2004). Although CoC adoption can con-
tribute to reducing the disease risk (mainly through good pond and water man-
agement, and therefore, improvement of farm environment) and thus reducing 
the uncertain production outcome, this could be perceived as a long-term con-
sequence. A large number of farmers are still waiting to see its proven effec-
tiveness.  
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6   Lymphoid Organ Vacuolization Virus (LOVV). Other than the disease risk, the profitability of shrimp farming is very suscepti-
ble to market condition. The production of P. vannamei first appeared in DOF 
statistics in 2003. It increased from 50% of total farm production in 2003 to 
75% in 2004. This created some market problems because of non-established 
market routes and thus uncertain orders for this new species. Thai proces-
sors/exporters did not accept P. vannamei until they identified marketing chan-
nels (Briggs et al., 2004: 32). They also paid lower prices than for P. monodon. 
The differences in wholesale prices can vary up to nearly 1 USD/kg depending 
on the sizes and season.
7 In addition, the product highly competes in the US 
market with those from Latin America, which mainly produces P. vannamei. 
Meanwhile, other negative impacts, especially on the environment, of this ex-
otic species are not yet known. Thailand currently restricts broodstock importa-
tion through registration. However, there has been no clear decision as to 
whether the country should promote, inhibit, or stop this species. This addi-
tional uncertainty could impede further development of important facilities such 
as market, breeding and genetic improvement techniques, and disease control. 
The uncertain condition in the industry would also tend to delay farmers’ decid-
ing to make an extra investment by adopting CoC.  
 
Other than the perceived production uncertainty, perceived fixed cost is another 
real obstacle to the voluntary adoption (Stanley, 2000). Compliance with CoC 
increases production costs by voluntary internalization of the environmental 
costs as adjusted to the standard. Cost of adoption is the primary impediment to 
voluntary adoption that aims at environmental improvement. Technically, farm-
ers need to sacrifice part of their farm land for a water treatment pond and 
sludge dumpsite. For example, using biotechnology-based CoC, the system re-
quires 25% of the culture area for water treatment pond and water recycle sys-
tem (See Coastal Fisheries Research and Development Bureau). This require-
ment could be seen as the main technical barrier in promoting CoC, particularly 
to small farms (less than 1.6 ha). A survey by the Pollution Control Department 
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7   The average wholesale price for all sizes of P. monodon and P. vannamei were 4.35 and 3.58, 
respectively, during April-December 2004 (calculated based on data from 
www.geocities.com/kanusorn/today.htm accessed on 1 February, 2006). (PCD) of more than 600 shrimp farms in 2000 showed that small farms allo-
cated 75% of their farm area for culture ponds and 25% for other uses, e.g. res-
ervoir, sludge pond, disk, storage house, etc.(PCD, 2002). By comparison, lar-
ger farms allocated a higher proportion of the land for other uses, and thus less 
proportion for culture area, i.e. 66% for 1.6-8 ha farms and 58% for larger than 
8 ha farms. This survey also showed that 61% of farms used water treatment 
pond, only 6.5% of farms had effluent treatment pond, 39% did not have any of 
these, and 12% did not have even a sludge dumpsite. These figures indicate that 
for large farms compliance with CoC means having to reset their farm structure 
and probably readjusting existing farm management techniques. For individual 
small farms, this means also substantial investment in additional farm land and 
water system, which are the main technical protocols of CoC in reducing dis-
ease risk and environmental damages.  
 
Eventually, farmers’ decisions will lean on economic performance, specifically 
in terms of perceived farm profitability. Increase in shrimp prices, improved 
yields, and reduced input use are expected from adoption. Nonetheless, obtain-
ing a premium price through certification of product quality and eco-labeling is 
subject to consumer awareness, especially of importing countries. At the pre-
sent stage, the effectiveness of Thai CoC implementation is still prone to some 
disease risks and market uncertainty.  
 
Lastly, the adoption is unlikely to guarantee profit-neutral in the short-term per-
spective in particular for individual small farms. Studies in agriculture on the 
adoption of BMPs that are meant to promote environmental protection revealed 
that relationships between the extent to which a farmer adopts the practices and 
the farm profit are not positive in all cases (Valentin et al. 2004). For example, 
the adoption of nutrient BMPs (i.e. split application, reduced application rate, 
soil testing, and site-specific management) to reduce the nutrient movement 
into surface water had a positive effect on profit for wheat and corn, but not for 
soybean and sorghum. Empirical testing of profit-neutral of shrimp CoC adop-
tion could provide evidence to support decision-making.  
 
 
216.  Lesson Learned from Other Countries 
The adoption can be country specific, or developed for a particular location, 
taking account local farming systems, social and economic context, markets and 
environments. Two examples of fast progressing shrimp industry and BMPs 
adoption from India (Bueno, 2006) and Vietnam (NACA et al., 2005) are cited 
here. More cases and details are available at www.enaca.org/shrimp.  
 
Shrimp farmers in India are, like other shrimp farmers in the region, repeatedly 
hard hit by virus diseases. They are the most vulnerable to shocks and least able 
to rebound from adversities. A shrimp health management project developed 
best health management practices for small farmers organized into “aquaclubs” 
(a group of 15-20 farmers). The project eventually evolved into a community 
development pilot with health management as the core technology. A project 
evaluation in 2004 found that the shrimp farmers that formed aquaclubs and 
adopted BMPs have increased yield by 33%, harvested shrimp that were 1.5 
times larger, and were visited 20% less frequently by diseases than surrounding 
non-adopting farmers. Moreover, their products became more attractive to buy-
ers because the shrimp had no antibiotic residues as the farm management prac-
tices they adopted exclude the use of banned drugs and chemicals. The project 
was subsequently expanded; another evaluation, of the 2005 crop results from 
930 demonstration ponds spread over 484 hectares of area in 15 villages, 
showed an increase in production by two-fold, 34% increase in size of shrimp, 
and 65% reduction in disease prevalence compared to surrounding non-
adopting ponds. There was a remarkable improvement in quality of the shrimps 
due to non-use of any banned chemicals and better practices during harvest and 
post-harvest handling. Another outcome is the contract seed production system, 
in which the organized small farmers could procure high quality of seeds at rea-
sonable price, and even offering premium price to hatchery owners for quality 
and reliable seed supply. 
 
Vietnam witnessed an outstanding 2-fold increase in aquaculture production 
only in the 5-year period 1998-2003 (1,150,000 tons in 2003). Shrimp farming 
 
22played a major role in this rapid development. According to FAO data, the pro-
duction over the same 5 year period registered 4-fold increase reaching over 
220,000 tons and that, according to national statistics, grew constantly to reach 
350,000 tons in 2005. 
 
Although continuously higher production could be an indicator of the healthy 
growth of the sector, the increased production observed in recent years was due 
more to an increase in the number of farms, than to improved productivity. This 
sharp increase in production came at a cost. Increasing environmental deteriora-
tion and the associated shrimp health problems, which in 2004 led to an esti-
mated loss of more than 11% of the total shrimp production, began to damage 
the sector. Farmers usually deal with these health problems by increasing the 
use of chemicals, involving sometimes the application of banned substances, 
which led importing countries to impose restrictions on Vietnamese aquaculture 
products. 
 
The government of Vietnam recognized the need for promoting a more sustain-
able development of the sector and initiated several activities in this direction. 
Among these is a project that supported coastal aquaculture, which demon-
strates the private and social benefits of adopting BMPs. BMPs were developed 
for broodstock traders, hatcheries, seed traders and farmers. Focus was given on 
the development of simple and practical BMPs, which addressed the needs of 
less resourced small-scale farmers. Ten sets of extension material were devel-
oped and disseminated in close collaboration with the Ministry of Fisheries. 
The tangible outcomes include the following: 
 
•  Implementation of BMPs for hatcheries was supported in six hatcheries 
and resulted in seed production up to 1.5 times higher and a price per unit 
seed of about 30-40% higher than non-BMPs seed. 
•  BMP implementation was also supported in 7 pilot farming communities 
(655 direct beneficiaries). The implementation led to a remarkably lower 
risk of mortality, higher production and higher probability of making a 
profit. 
 
23•  Farming communities that introduced seed testing increased their chances 
of making a profit of over 7 times.  
•  BMP application led to average yields that were sometimes more than 4 
times higher than in farms where BMP had not been adopted. 
•  The project BMPs were also incorporated into the draft standards for the 
production of organic seed.  
 
The project also strengthened the institutions involved with seed health man-
agement by conducting training courses and by supporting the development of 
national and provincial-level legal documents to improve the process of seed 
screening and certification. While there was no formal farmers' association, 
the Vietnamese farmers were informally organized at the village level and, 
through periodic meetings, the farmers in the same village became in-
volved as a group in the adoption of BMPs. Because hatcheries and brood-
stock traders also adopted BMPs that pertained to their sectors, the overall 
benefit was mutually beneficial relations and trust among them.  
 
The projects are providing indications that BMP adoption is not a problem for 
well organized small-scale farmers. Being organized enables them to attain 
economy of scale to be able to comply with the best practices requirements. It is 
obvious that successful BMPs implementation in these two countries do not fo-
cus only on technical solutions, the projects have engendered harmony and co-
operation among players in the market chain. More fundamental than the small 
farmers and the environment benefiting from BMPs is the social harmony it en-
genders. The above projects have arguably served to enhance trust and coopera-
tion among the players in the market chain. The logic of this proposition is that 
the players stand to gain more from each one behaving responsibly towards one 





247.  Challenges and Practical Solutions 
The big challenge with voluntary adoption relates to the issue of trust among 
players in the market chain. The adopters may not be totally convinced that they 
are the beneficiaries, and farmers may doubt that the program will effectively 
improve the environment if some adopt but many others do not. In short, this is 
a concern over free-riders. On the other hand, as the above projects illustrate, 
engendering trust among operators and stakeholders, for instance, between 
farmers and hatchery operators, farmers and feed/drug suppliers, and among re-
source users including shrimp farmers and other users of coastal resources (wa-
ter in particular), would encourage adoption. Importantly, farmers are in a 
stronger position to deal with other players if they are organized. 
 
In Thailand, industry associations of shrimp farmers, hatchery operators, input 
suppliers, and processors/exporters exist. However, a more cohesive network 
among the stakeholder groups (farmers, input suppliers and proces-
sors/exporters) and between them would make the industry stronger in dealing 
with persisting problems such as disease risk and market uncertainty. This 
mechanism would support CoC adoption in terms of sharing and exchanging in-
formation and knowledge, reducing profit uncertainties, sharing the cost of 
adoption, and perhaps reducing the cost of implementation. An example of the 
latter is for group members to share the water and effluent treatment and dis-
posal systems. A “Group CoC” certification could be given to a qualified asso-
ciation or group rather than to individual members. This would facilitate moni-
toring as farm inspection could be conducted randomly among group members. 
Groups of small farms participating in the seawater irrigation projects can be 
candidates for this scheme since a common water system has already been pro-
vided by the government.
8  
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8   Thai Government has invested the seawater irrigation system (SWIS) to facilitate shrimp farm-
ing. Two big projects have been implemented by DOF in Kung Krabaen Bay, Chanthaburi 
province and in Pak Phanang, Nakhon Sri Thammarat province. The SWIS comprises three 
main components: 1) pumping of quality water from the sea through the inlet and pumping of 
water effluent back to the sea through the outlet, 2) treatment of water supply, and 3) treatment 
of water effluent. Farmers share water supply and are responsible for the operation and mainte-Managing the biophysical factors associated with risk and uncertainty (e.g. dis-
ease, seed quality, stocking, feeding, water and pond soil quality), in practice, 
varies by site and by farm. The development of individual farm manuals fol-
lowing the CoC guidelines could be another challenge for achieving a mutual 
standard and gaining acceptance by farmers at the same time. CoC knowledge 
transfer from DOF’s farm trainers to farmers needs to be done with a clear un-
derstanding of the problems existing in each particular farm. Fundamentally, 
large farms usually have a high capacity to develop their own management 
techniques. The collaboration between DOF and large farms in developing suit-
able techniques under CoC could enhance the relevance of the practices to the 
farming localities.  
 
Uncertainty is high in the early stage of the adoption process of any innovation 
(Pannell, 2003: 74). If the CoC process is further developed and demonstrated 
in put in trials, the adoption process will potentially reduce risk and uncertainty 
over time by collection, integration and evaluation of new information obtained. 
This adaptive manner of CoC implementation could be deemed as a risk man-
agement process, although it is never reached zero-risk and nil-probability of 
uncertainty.  
8.  Other Supportive Policies 
This section suggests some supportive policies and measures for decision mak-
ers to consider as complement to voluntary management scheme. The further 
development of CoC that focuses on improving farmers’ perceptions of long-
term benefits and reducing perceived risks will increase adoption. The latter 
will reinforce the former since it makes long-term profitability more predict-
able. As described above these are critical to the success of voluntary adoption. 
They are relevant particularly that the scheme aims to promote environmentally 
friendly practices.  
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nance costs. DOF also trained farmers in farm management techniques and formed a farmers’ 
association to operate the system. See Chuaduangpui and Ikejima (2005).  An insurance scheme would reduce perceived risks associated with CoC adop-
tion. In the USA, green insurance policy has been used to promote some BMPs 
aimed at environmental protection. For example, a corn root-worm integrated 
pest management (IPM) insurance is sold to a farmer following a certified crop 
consultant’s recommendation to not treat with insecticides. If the IPM recom-
mendation fails, indemnity is paid based on the observed root rating and lodg-
ing (Mitchell and Hannessy, 2003). Other policies include a nitrogen fertilizer 
insurance against excess rainfall that would prevent side-dress nitrogen applica-
tion on corn; a Bt corn refuge insurance that insures against yield loss due to in-
sect damage; and other specific nutrient BMPs insurance (Mitchell, 2004). The 
studies advocate insurance as a tool to increase the incentives for farmer to 
adopt a BMP. Like other types of single peril insurance, green insurance could 
be privately provided without premium subsidies, and so attain the efficiency of 
market-based provision of adoption incentives (Mitchell and Hannessy, 2003: 
53). At the same time, the same authors warn of associated issues of insurance 
policy such as moral hazard and adverse selection. The opportunity presented 
by a scheme for beneficiaries to influence the likelihood of a loss to occur so 
they can claim indemnity is a moral hazard. Documentation requirements and a 
certified crop consultant to develop the practices were suggested as means to 
reduce the problem. Adverse selection can occur when a certain insurance pre-
mium is based on average yield, when in reality there are differences in yields 
among farms (i.e. differences in risk expectations). Farmers with a higher aver-
age yield have a greater incentive to buy insurance since they are likely to re-
ceive a higher indemnity than the premium they paid. Premium subsidies to 
farmers with lower yield and multiple-peril insurance premium have been sug-
gested to mitigate this problem. Lastly, Babcock et al. (2003) added that insur-
ance programs may exclude small farms as paying premium increases their 
production costs. The offer of group insurance under “Group CoC” (see above 
discussion) may facilitate farmers’ decision to participate in the program.  
 
Encouraging and strengthening farmer organizations would support CoC im-
plementation. This includes the provision of assistance on group basis, rather 
than on individual basis. This changing of organization boundary can result in 
 
27self-monitoring and self-inspection within the group. This may further form an 
implicit social sanction system in the industry, which works by peer or group 
pressure to assure that everyone in the group behaves responsibly. If this is the 
case, implementation of a voluntary scheme is likely to be more effective than 
using legal sanctions, or more acceptable than using market-incentive based 
tools to protecting the environment. It is widely accepted that the main limita-
tion to the success of implementing regulations is the efficacy of enforcement, 
which relies on supportive institutional structure. The development of aquacul-
ture regulations does not assure that the regulations will be applied at the farm 
level, and the effort to enforce compliance would be difficult and expensive 
(Boyd, 2003). Meanwhile, using incentive-based tools such as green taxation 
imposed on externalities, in principle, is more effective than mandate command 
and leads to efficiency outcome. It is however deemed as a tough measure for 
most developing countries and usually politically unacceptable. See discussion 
in Pongthanapanich (2005a).  
 
This paper suggests a combination of policy approaches that would offer a 
number of options to a farmer according to his circumstances, capacities and 
constraints. This may eventually stabilize the implementation of environmental 
policies. Pongthanapanich (2005b) showed an evidence of potential vigor of us-
ing mixed approaches. The study found that using a combination of incentive-
based tool such as green taxation and nonincentive-based tool such as coastal 
land use zoning (concerning the carrying capacity of receiving waters) opti-
mally leads to both economically and environmentally responsible shrimp farm-
ing. In contrast, using effluent standard alone as currently being implemented 
will not. And a zoning scheme alone does not account for externalities. Al-
though some impacts can be limited by zoning, its effectiveness depends much 
on the efficacy of control over specific land use. Using voluntary management 
per se has some challenges and conditions for successful application as dis-
cussed above. Furthermore, incentive-based approach and mandatory control 
approach can become a background threat to voluntary approach (Sterner, 2003: 
393). For example, if a voluntary approach is not successful in meeting a satis-
factory environmental quality, the other approaches will be implemented.  
 
28The revenue from a green tax imposed on common practice farms may be used 
to support voluntary adoption of environmentally friendly farms. However, 
more clearly specified practices (see Boyd, 2003) under Thai CoC are needed to 
fulfil each environmental improvement objective; and therefore adoption of 
these practices can be supported by a green tax. Subsequently, alternative prac-
tices and management options can be evaluated (see Engle and Valderrama, 
2004).  
 
Finally, total costs including implementation cost, and benefits generated from 
the entire industry (from each section of the chain from farm to export) based 
on sustainable development in condition of various policy scenarios should be 
estimated. The analysis can show whether income generated from the industry 
under a particular management approach would offset the cost. It would also 
indicate how the costs and benefits may be redistributed. In principle, the break-
even price of a clean and green product must be higher than the current price 
received. Producers and consumers could share responsibilities. Consumers can 
encourage adoption by bearing the extra cost of producing a safe product. This 
can be in a form of a premium price for certified products. Farmers would bene-
fit from a higher farm-gate price. At the same time, farmers should bear the en-
vironmental cost. The cost-return comparison between common practice, GAP 
and COC farming can roughly show these additional payments. It would inform 
decision makers if a recalculation were made that would show whether or not 
the industry, by following environmentally friendly practices, brings net benefit 
to the nation.  
9.  Conclusion 
This paper examines the implementation framework and outcomes of voluntary 
management scheme, i.e. the Code of Conduct or CoC. The scheme has been 
promoted by the Department of Fisheries since 2002 as to achieve environ-
mental responsibility and sustainable development of Thai shrimp industry. So 
far the numbers of adopters is insignificant compared to total shrimp farms and 
 
29what the implementation program expected. The study aims to provide some 
suggests for enhancing the scheme.  
 
The analysis shows that the success of the implementation is directly influenced 
by farmers’ perception of future changes in farm profits due to the adoption. 
This includes the perceived risks and uncertainties associated with the adoption 
and the industry per se. Apart from the uncertain market condition, disease out-
break is the greatest risk that generates high loss of production and thus adds to 
the uncertainty of making a profit. The perceived additional fixed cost of efflu-
ent treatment facility as a main technical requirement of the scheme in reducing 
pollution is another important barrier. This is relevant to Thailand where 80% is 
small-scale farms. 
 
Risk management that aims to increase farmers’ acceptability to adopt such in-
novation is an adaptive process. The enhancement of voluntary adoption is thus 
partly to improve farmers’ perception through increased information and 
knowledge. The mechanisms and policies, which can improve its effectiveness, 
could be visualized through demonstration projects especially those designed to 
address the needs of small-scale farmers. Sharing the effluent treatment facility 
together with a “Group CoC” certification system could be a solution to the ex-
perienced high investment costs of individual small farmers. An insurance 
scheme safeguarding against losses associated with the adoption could be an-
other policy option. Evidently, strong cooperation among players in the market 
chain has shown to be a powerful mechanism as the individual player stands to 
gain on the collective action. Strengthening farmer organization would also 
support the implementation as it would permit self-monitoring, self-inspection 
and implicit social control system to enforcement on a voluntary basis. 
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35Appendix 1.  Certification process for Thai Quality 
Shrimp Product 
 
Apply for labels from DOF
Hatcheries Processors  Distributors Farms
Enroll in the program
Follow CoC guideline in assistance from DOF
Request for CoC inspection from DOF
Inspection process by DOF
Pass  Not Pass  Improve 
DOF provides CoC certifications to qualified individual operators 
CoC hatcheries  CoC distributors  CoC farms  CoC processors 
CoC shrimp products 
Products with Thai 
Quality Shrimp 
Product labels 
Source: Adapted from Marine Shrimp Culture Research Institute.  
www.thaiqualityshrimp.com/upload/production_coc/16/plan_th.gif (in Thai). 
 
36Appendix 2.  Certification process for CoC farms 
No improvement 
Improvement 
Farmers apply to join the program  
(incl. farm registration and inspection) 
Farm training by DOF local trainer to develop individual farm manual
DOF local conductor coordinates to deliver the manual to auditor 
Assigned auditor gives advise to improve the manual, evaluate the farm, 
and report the score to Marine Shrimp Culture Research Institute  
Marine Shrimp Culture Research Institute passes the case to DOF Director 
General (DG) for the approval of CoC certification 
DOF local inspector records and inspects the approved CoC farm 
Still qualified  No-longer qualitfied 
Conductor proposes DG to withdraw the certification Inspector reports to DOF 
 
Source: Adapted from Marine Shrimp Culture Research Institute.  




Appendix 3.  Cost-return of Thai shrimp farming 




Survey year  2002  2005  2005 
Number of respondents (Farms)  10    87 
1. Cost (USD/Kg)  3.02  3.02
1/ 2.40 
2. Price (USD/kg)  5.00  3.15  3.01 
3. Profit=2-1 (USD/kg)  1.98  0.13  0.61 
4. Yield (kg/ha-of culture area)  4137  4137
1/ 8629 
5. Profit per ha=3*4  8171  538  5272 
6. Size (pieces/kg)  69  70  71 
7. Survival rate (%)  69    81 
8. Culture cycle (days/crop)  120    111 
Note: 
1/  Data from non-CoC farms from Table 1 and 2. 
  2  Proxy value. The calculation is based on the cost and yield of 2002 and use average price 
data of year 2005 (www.geocities.com/kanusorn/today.htm, accessed on 1 February, 
2006).  
  3/  Mostly non-CoC farms, but certified as GAP farms. 
Source: 
1/  OAE (2004). 
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